Bots & traffic

6 min readUpdated

What is bot management?

Quick answer

Bot management is the practice of telling automated traffic apart from human traffic and applying a different policy to each kind — allowing the bots you want, limiting the ones you tolerate, and stopping the ones that cost you money. It is distinct from DDoS protection: bots may arrive at completely ordinary request rates and still cause harm by scraping prices, testing stolen credentials or buying limited stock before your customers can.

01Why bots need their own policy

Automated traffic is now the majority. Imperva's 2026 Bad Bot Report found that bots generated more than 53% of all web traffic in 2025, up from 51% the year before, and the 2025 edition classed 37% of all 2024 traffic as bad bots. Much of the rest is neither an attack nor a customer. Treating everything as human means scrapers copy your catalogue; treating everything as suspicious breaks the integrations your business depends on.

OWASP's Automated Threats to Web Applications project names the abuse patterns and gives teams a shared vocabulary. These are the ones most sites meet first:

  • Credential stuffing (OAT-008): mass login attempts that test leaked username and password pairs
  • Scraping (OAT-011): competitors copying prices, listings or content wholesale
  • Carding (OAT-001): validating stolen card numbers with small payment attempts
  • Denial of inventory (OAT-021): holding limited stock in baskets that never check out, so real buyers cannot
  • Scalping (OAT-005): buying limited goods faster than people can, usually to resell them
  • Spamming (OAT-017): automated posts to forms, comments and sign-ups

02How bots are detected

No single signal is reliable, so detection across the industry stacks many weak ones. Individually each has false positives; together they are hard to fake consistently. OWASP's bot management cheat sheet recommends combining controls at the edge, in the application and in the back end for the same reason.

SignalWhat it revealsWeakness
TLS fingerprintWhich library performed the handshake, whatever user-agent is claimedShared by every client on the same software, and can be imitated
HTTP/2 settings and header patternsWhether the client behaves like the browser engine it claims to beProxies and privacy tools alter them for real users too
BehaviourWhether pages load their sub-resources, how navigation flows, how fast pages are requestedNeeds several requests before it says anything
NetworkDatacentre ranges are normal for API clients and unusual for a claimed home browserVPNs, corporate proxies and mobile carriers blur it
Challenge outcomeWhether the client can run JavaScript or complete a taskHeadless browsers are real browsers and can pass
Account and business contextLogin failure ratios, basket age, payment declinesVisible only in the application, often after the fact

03Fingerprinting, and its limits

A TLS fingerprint such as JA3 or JA4 summarises how a client negotiates the connection: the cipher suites it offers, its extensions and, in JA3's case, their order. It identifies the underlying library, which is why a basic script claiming to be Chrome stands out: it negotiates like its HTTP library, not like Chrome.

The limit is that fingerprints are shared, not unique. Every Chrome user on the same version and platform presents essentially the same handshake, so a fingerprint identifies a class of software, never a person. Tools also exist that imitate browser handshakes closely, so a match shows what a client presents, not what it is. Fingerprinting is good at answering 'what software is this?' and poor at answering 'what does it intend?'

04Responses, from lightest to heaviest

Bot management is not a block button. The response should be proportionate to the confidence and to the cost of being wrong.

  • Allow: verified crawlers and known integrations, passed without friction
  • Rate limit: tolerated automation kept to a sane pace rather than shut out
  • Automatic challenge: a check the browser completes without the visitor doing anything, such as a proof-of-work challenge; a brief pause for a person, a real cost for a script running at volume
  • Interactive challenge: a visible check such as a CAPTCHA for when an automatic one is not enough, with an accessible alternative for people who cannot complete it
  • Block: for unambiguous cases such as exploit probes, known attack tooling and verified impersonators

05Matching the response to the threat

Each automated threat leaves different traces and calls for different controls. Several of the strongest controls live in the application rather than at the edge, which is why bot management works best when security and product teams agree on it together.

ThreatTypical tracesProportionate controls
Credential stuffingMany usernames per source, a high login failure ratio, attempts spread over many addressesPer-account and per-route limits, a step-up challenge on login, multi-factor authentication, breached-password checks
ScrapingSystematic walks through listings or IDs, few page assets fetched, a steady pace around the clockRate limits per client, challenges on listing and search pages, caching so each copy costs you little
CardingMany small payment attempts, a high decline rate, many cards per account or sessionLimits on payment attempts per account, card and session; 3-D Secure; your payment provider's fraud tools
Denial of inventoryBaskets filled but never paid, many fresh accounts holding stockShort basket hold times, per-account quantity caps, stock reserved only at payment
SpamForm posts with no preceding page view, links in every fieldA challenge on submission, server-side validation, moderation queues
Verified crawlersA known operator and published address rangesAllow, with gentle rate limits and good caching

06Rolling it out without breaking things

Most of the damage bot management does comes from switching it on everywhere at once. A staged rollout avoids that.

  • List the automation you depend on: search crawlers, uptime monitors, payment and webhook callbacks, partner APIs and your own mobile app
  • Give machine clients an authenticated way in, such as API keys, signed webhooks or mutual TLS, instead of expecting them to behave like browsers
  • Start in a log-only mode and review what would have been challenged; as OWASP's cheat sheet puts it, 'you cannot tune what you cannot see'
  • Enforce first on the routes where abuse costs most: login, sign-up, checkout and search
  • Watch business metrics as well as block counts: login success, conversion, basket abandonment and support tickets
  • Keep an accessible alternative and a contact route for anyone who gets stuck

07The failure mode to design against

Every bot management system has a dial between catching bots and blocking customers, and the two are not equally expensive. Missing a scraper costs you some data. Blocking a customer costs you the customer, and they rarely tell you: they just leave.

Practical safeguards: corroborate before acting, prefer a challenge to a block where confidence is low, lift a client's penalties once it has proved itself, and review blocked traffic regularly for groups of legitimate users who share a trait, such as a school, an office network or an assistive technology.

Questions

Frequently asked questions

DDoS protection is about volume: keeping a service up under a flood. Bot management is about intent, and applies at completely normal traffic levels. A scraper copying your catalogue at fifty requests a second is a bot problem, not a DDoS.

Sophisticated ones can. Tools exist that imitate browser TLS handshakes closely, and headless browsers are real browsers. That is why mature bot management combines fingerprints with behaviour, reputation and application context.

It should not, if it is set up deliberately. List the automation you rely on before enforcing anything, give integrations authenticated access such as API keys or signed requests, and allowlist partners explicitly. Then review what the rules would have caught before switching them on.

No. Visible CAPTCHAs can be solved by machine learning or by paid human solving services, and they add friction for every real visitor. They work best as one late step in a layered approach, with an accessible alternative for people who cannot complete them.

Imperva's 2026 Bad Bot Report put automated traffic at more than 53% of all web traffic in 2025, up from 51% in 2024. Figures vary between vendors because each measures its own customers' traffic, so treat any single number as an indication rather than a census.

Sources

Sources and verification

  1. 01Bad Bot Report 2026: The Internet Is No Longer Human · Imperva
  2. 022025 Imperva Bad Bot Report: AI-driven bots surpass human traffic · Thales / Imperva
  3. 03OWASP Automated Threats to Web Applications · OWASP
  4. 04OAT-008 Credential Stuffing · OWASP
  5. 05Bot Management and Anti-Automation Cheat Sheet · OWASP Cheat Sheet Series

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